Is Technology Morally Neutral? Joseph C. Pitt and the Value Neutrality Thesis
To quote Pitt, the Value Neutrality Thesis (VAT) states the following:
“Technological artifacts do not have, have embedded in them, or contain values.”
We could rephrase the thesis by stating that technology in itself is neither liberating nor constraining, it is neither conducive to securing the interests of those in power nor necessarily instruments of subversion or emancipation. Depending on how technology is used, the results and moral values it embodies are entirely subject to variation. People therefore, and their actions “contain” or express values, not artefacts. Of course, the objection here would be whether it makes any sense at all to speak about technology in the same way that we speak of “scientific truths”; as abstract isolated universal statements. In other words, is it at all legitimate to speak of technology outside of its particular context?
Starting from scratch, Pitt wants to define the notion of values. Further, what does it mean and what follows from the statement: “Humans [or only humans] have values”? Does it mean that only humans have values and therefore, everything that is non-human i.e. object or piece of equipment cannot have values or does this mean that humans have values and therefore, everything humans make are also value-laden entities? As you can see, the two implications are directly opposed to each other.
Pitt takes an interesting approach in demonstrating the validity of VAT. According to him, technology is neutral, because the creation of a technological artefact is invested with too many opposing values. Technology is, one may say, over-determined with values in a way that renders it neutral.
Here’s Pitt’s definition of value: “a value is an endorsement of a preferred state of affairs by an individual or group of individuals that motivates our actions.” This definition is a pragmatist account of values. It points to a specific practical end, “state of affairs” that needs to be motivated. And motivation here implies a real capacity for action as opposed to a purely theoretical or dogmatic account of value theory. Values are goal-oriented, motivated and action-driven. Values are intangible entities, which renders them difficult to pin down. The purpose of the pragmatist approach is precisely this, to provide a definition of values that one can trace to observable human action and objective states of affairs.
Despite the fact that humans constantly use artefacts as a means to achieve their ends, furthermore, despite the fact that all artefacts embody the potential of such use necessarily, it is close to impossible to map out a one-to-one correlation between a piece of technology and a particular, human value-laden action. We do not know, which particular value-system this or that technology would serve at a given moment. Technology cannot be used in a neutral way, but technology itself is neutral.
REF
Pitt, Joseph C. ““Guns Don’t Kill, People Kill”; Values in and/or Around Technologies.” In The moral status of technical artefacts, pp. 89–101. Springer, Dordrecht, 2014.
